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Prohibition: Use of the Writ of
Restraint in California
By WILmIAM B. BOONE*
M ANY of the problems and issues common to other writ proceedings
are encountered also in proceedings for the writ of prohibition. These
include the rather nebulous concepts of jurisdiction, discretion, pre-
rogative, adequacy of the legal remedy, and the like.
In addition, the writ of prohibition has problems peculiar to itself
arising from its nature as a writ of restraint as distinguished from a
writ of review. Prohibition may issue only to restrain threatened
action of a judicial tribunal and not to annul completed acts (the
function of certiorari), although this distinction is often difficult to find
in the more recent California decisions.
In prohibition proceedings the value of precedent over principle is
perhaps more apparent than in any other form of procedure. This
situation arises not so much from any great fluctuations in the basic
principles as from the nature of the principles themselves. To achieve a
practical -comprehension of jurisdiction, adequacy of remedy at law,
completed action and similar terms as used in prohibition proceedings,
the decisions must be reviewed. The meaning of these terms is found
more in the patterns formed by the cases than in any attempted defini-
tions, and the supreme court has frankly so stated.' It is for this reason
that this analysis of the use of the writ of prohibition in California
proceeds rather abruptly from a brief statement of the foundational
rules to their practical application.
Principles Affecting the Issuance of Prohibition
Nature of the Writ
The writ of prohibition arrests the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board or person exercising judicial functions, when the
proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the tribunal,
corporation, board or person.2 It may be issued by any court, except
a municipal or justice court, to an inferior tribunal or to a corporation,
board or person, in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, upon the verified peti-
tion of the person beneficially interested.'
* LL.B., Hastings College of Law, 1950; member, Sonoma County Bar.
'Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 287-91, 109 P.2d 942 (1941)
(dealing with "junsdiction")
'CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1102.
'CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1103; CAL. CONST. art VI, §§ 4, 4(b), 5.
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Partzes to the Proceeding
In the early development of the writ of prohibition the lower court
was a party to the litigation in a substantial sense. In California practice,
however, an application to an appellate court for the writ is simply a
means of reviewing action or threatened action by a trial court. In most
prohibition proceedings the matter is adversary in character and the
lower court is a merely nominal respondent, with the result that the
higher court may award incidental relief directly to the petitioner and
against the real party in interest.4
Tribunals Subject to the Wrzt
The writ of prohibition is not confined in its operation to restraining
trial courts from acting in original proceedings, although that is its
most common application. It lies also to prevent a lower appellate court
from reviewing a matter of which it has no jurisdiction.5 Nor is the
writ limited to control of lower courts. Any tribunal exercising judicial
functions may be restrained by prohibition.' The test of its use is
whether the functions sought to be restrained are those of a judicial
tribunal as distinguished from an administrative agency.
7
Threatened or Completed Act
Prohibition is a preventive rather than a corrective remedy, in that
it ordinarily issues only to prevent the commission of a future act and
not to undo an act already performed.8 However, the writ is excluded
only in cases where the action of the inferior tribunal is completed
and nothing remains to be done in pursuance of its void order. If its
action is not completed, its further proceedings may be stayed by
prohibition, and, when necessary to afford complete and adequate relief,
what has been done will be undone.' Thus the writ may be granted to
restrain the trial court from further judicial action based upon a void
order or interlocutory judgment," from entering judgment upon a min-
ute order so directing," or from enforcing an order appointing a re-
" Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 676, 686-87, 242 P.2d 321 (1952) (power to award
suit money incidental to prohibition proceeding).
5 Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 287, 109 P.2d 942 (1941) (writ
issued to restrain mandate proceeding pending in a district court of appeal).
'Scott v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 90, 293 P.2d 18 (1956) (writ to test
jurisdiction of Industrial Accident Commission).
'Fleischer v. Adult Authority, 202 Cal. App. 2d 44, 47, 48, 20 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1962)
(denying writ).
" McCormick v. Mumcipal Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 819, 820-21, 16 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1961).
'Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 563, 580, 96 P.2d 107 (1939; Hall v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. 373, 387, 245 Pac. 814 (1926) ; Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327,
390-91, 24 Pac. 121 (1890)
"Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 55, 60, 251 P.2d 10 (1952);
City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 483, 487-88, 224 P.2d 685 (1950).
' City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 245, 1 Cal. Rptr.
158, 347 P.2d 294 (1959)
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ceiver," although in each of these instances it is apparent that the
action of the inferior court has been substantially completed.
This limitation upon the use of prohibition is more apparent than
real, for the ingenuity of counsel may be trusted to phrase the petition
in terms of prevention rather than correction or at least to request
certiorari or other appropriate writ in the event that the preventive
phrasing is deemed insufficient.
Lzmitatwn to Jurisdictional Questions
The only question which may be considered in a prohibition pro-
ceeding is one of jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. Prohibition may
not be used to restrain the commission of nonjurisdictional errors or
to regulate or control procedure not involving jurisdiction. 3
The principle that prohibition is a jurisdictional writ is clear, but
its application in practice is replete with confusion.'4 The supreme court
undertook to explain the principle in Abelleira v. District Court of
Appeali' somewhat as follows: Lack of jurisdiction in its most funda-
mental sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the
case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties. But
in its ordinary usage lack of jurisdiction is not limited to fundamental
situations. For the purpose of determining the right to restrain by pro-
hibition, a much broader meaning is given. In such proceedings, lack
of jurisdiction may be applied to a case where, although the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental
sense, it has no "jurisdiction" or power to act except in a particular
manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the oc-
curence of certain procedural prerequisites.
The supreme court further stated that in general any acts which
exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power
be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or
rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare
decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction in the sense that those acts may
be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari. 6 Thus, a jurisdic-
tional question may arise merely from the manner in which the inferior
tribunal exercises a power which it otherwise possesses. If a court has
' Rondos v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 190, 311 P.2d 113 (1957).
" C. S. Smith Metropolitan Mkt. Co. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 226, 228, 105 P.2d
587 (1940), Fitts v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 2d 514, 519, 51 P.2d 66 (1935), Tulare Ir.
Dist. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 649, 668-69, 242 Pac. 725 (1925).
4 See, e.g., Comment, 36 CAL. L. Rv. 75, 80-82, 110 (1948)
"17 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942, 947 (1941).
"Id. at 291, 109 P.2d at 948.
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authority to act only in a particular manner, it may be restrained by
prohibition from acting in a different, unauthorized manner."
A jurisdictional problem in the prohibition sense will ordinarily
arise when the court is proceeding in violation of or at variance with
a mandatory constitutional or statutory provision. Further attempts
at generalization are not particularly helpful; one must instead attempt
to find a pattern in the precedents relating to a particular question.
Preliminary Objection in Lower Court
Since the trial court has power to determine its own jurisdiction in
the first instance, it is ordinarily necessary to challenge the jurisdiction
of the trial court in that court, by demurrer, motion, plea or other ob-
jection, in order to obtain a preliminary decision on jurisdiction. Unless
and until a preliminary decision is rendered, there is nothing for a
higher court to prohibit. Once the trial court has heard the jurisdictional
challenge and has rejected it, the higher court may then appropriately
consider the question on application for a writ of prohibition. 8
The petition for the writ should affirmatively allege that the chal-
lenge to jurisdiction was raised in the lower court unless it otherwise
appears from the circumstances that the court has necessarily decided in
favor of its jurisdiction and is proceeding in an attempted exercise
thereof. 9 Even then prohibition may be denied if the jurisdictional
issue depends upon questions of fact. 0
Adequacy of Remedy by Appeal
The issue of whether an adequate remedy exists, so that the writ
of prohibition should not be granted, most often revolves about the
remedy by appeal. The adequacy of that remedy, in turn, depends
largely upon the time when an appeal can be taken and the possible
intervening consequences.
Where there is a right to an immediate review by appeal, that
remedy is said to be almost as speedy as a writ proceeding and will
be considered adequate unless exceptional circumstances are shown. 1
But no hard and fast rule. exists; the requirements of justice in a
"
T City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 244, 1 Cal. Rptr.
158, 347 P.2d 294 (1959)
"Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 630, 634, 284 P.2d 9 (1955) ; Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 28 Cal. 2d 460, 464-65, 171 P.2d 8 (1946) ; see Bakersfield Hacienda, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 798, 801, 18 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1962).
"'Rescue Army v. Mumcipal Court, supra note 18, at 465; Havemeyer v. Superior Court,
84 Cal. 327, 391, 24 Pac. 121 (1890)
"Brock v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 2d 682, 687, 81 P.2d 931 (1938)
" Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 363, 370, 217 P.2d 951 (1950) (involving a
mandate proceeding).
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particular case must be considered.' Obviously, where a defendant
claims that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over his person (in the
fundamental sense), the remedy by appeal cannot be adequate since it
would require a general appearance and a consequent waiver of the
very jurisdictional question sought to be determined.23
The lack of an adequate remedy in the way of an appeal is more
apparent when no appeal is available before final judgment and the
lower court is proceeding with the trial of an action over which it has
no jurisdiction. 4 This is especially true when the object of a statutory
right would be defeated if the petitioner were compelled to await relief
by appeal from the final judgment.25 Similarly, a requirement that a
defendant in a criminal case stand trial by a court which acts without
or in excess of its jurisdiction would be an imposition of personal hard-
ship upon the defendant and a futile expense to the public.!6 In such
cases, therefore, it is readily held that the right to appeal from a sub-
sequent judgment is an inadequate remedy.
The lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is
even more striking when the petitioner has exhausted his rights of
appeal to no avail, as where he has no right of appeal beyond the
superior court.
Adequacy of Other Remedies
The fact that one against whom contempt proceedings are brought
has a remedy by certiorari or habeas corpus if found guilty has been
deemed sufficient to deny prohibition prior to the hearing of the contempt
charges.28 In subsequent cases, however, prohibition has issued both to
restrain the hearing of the contempt charges29 and to restrain enforce-
" Gorbacheff v. Justice's Court, 31 Cal. 2d 178, 180, 187 P.2d 407 (1947)
"Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 304, 2 P.2d 756 (1931) ; Bakersfield Hacienda,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 798, 802, 18 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1962).
'Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 630, 635, 284 P.2d 9 (1955); Tomales Bay
Oyster Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 389, 392, 217 P.2d 968 (1950), City of San
Diego v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 483, 485, 224 P.2d 685 (1950)
'Kennaley v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 512, 514, 275 P.2d 1 (1954) (prohibition
to determine right to require bond to secure costs); City & County of San Francisco v.
Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 156, 161, 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (use of writ to test discovery
order).
" Moore v. Municipal Court, 170 Cal. App. 2d 548, 552, 339 P.2d 196 (1959) (also
emphasizing the limited appeal from municipal court)
"Redlands High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 348, 351, 125 P.2d 490
(1942) ; see also Gorbacheff v. Justice's Court, 31 Cal. 2d 178, 180, 187 P.2d 407 (1947)
" C. S. Smith Metropolitan Mkt. Co. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 226, 228-29, 105
P.2d 587 (1940).
"Farnham v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 2d 451, 456, 10 Cal Rptr. 615 (1961).
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ment of a contempt order already made"0 where the showing made was
insufficient to warrant the contempt proceeding.
Similarly, it was once thought that habeas corpus was an adequate
remedy to test the validity of a statute or ordinance under which the
petitioner was charged in a criminal case, so that prohibition should be
denied.31 Here also the later cases have upheld the use of prohibition.32
Alternative Writ as Decision on Inadequate Remedy
In practice the issue of the adequacy of legal remedies is now de-
cided in granting or denying the alternative writ. If the alternative writ
is issued, ordinarily that question will not be considered further in
determining the application for a peremptory writ.33 Similarly, in a
proceeding brought to the supreme court by petition for hearing after
the district court of appeal has issued an alternative writ and decided
the merits, the supreme court will not ordinarily reconsider the ade-
quacy of other remedies.34 In such instances it is apparent that denial
of prohibition on procedural grounds will often result in a failure of
justice as well as in unnecessary delay in resolving the dispute.
Appellate Review of Prohibztion Proceedings
On appeal from an order granting or denying a petition for writ
of prohibition, it has been said that the writ is an extraordinary remedy
which does not issue as a matter of right; that appellate review, there-
fore, is limited to a determination of whether or not an abuse of dis-
cretion is shown; that the discretion of the court to which application
is first made extends to such matters as the existence or absence of an
adequate remedy at law, whether the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal
is clear or debatable, whether or not such jurisdiction depends on facts
outside the record, the right of the petitioner to raise the jurisdictional
question, and similar matters; and that the decision granting or deny-
ing the writ will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse
of discretion." Nevertheless, there are instances in which the appellate
"9Warner v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 2d 821, 273 P.2d 89 (1954) Query, in
what respect does prohibition under this decision differ from certiorari?
' Leach v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 531, 12 P.2d 1 (1932)
'Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal. 2d 315, 323, 223 P.2d 465 (1950) (writ denied
on merits); Moore v. Mumcipal Court, 170 Cal. App. 2d 548, 553, 339 P.2d 196 (1959)
(writ demed on merits) ; compare Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal. 2d 460, 465-66,
171 P.2d 8 (1946) (refusing to follow the Leach case where habeas corpus was unavailable
because defendant was not being deprived of his liberty)
'City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 243, 1 Cal. Rptr.
158, 347 P.2d 294 (1959) ; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 429, 333
P.2d 745 (1959), Berg v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 2d 565, 566, 5 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1960).
"Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 283 P.2d 704 (1955).
i W A. Rose Co. v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 2d 67, 74, 1 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1959);
Dickenson v. Mumicpal Court, 162 Cal. App. 2d 85, 88, 328 P.2d 32 (1958); see Witkin,
Extraordinary Writ - Friend or Enemy, 29 Cal. S. BAR J. 467, 472 (1954)
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courts have proceeded to determine the merits of an application for
prohibition upon appeal from an order denying the writ, without any
mention of the subject of discretion.36
Appeal or New Proceeding
Where a petition for writ of prohibition is denied by a district
court of appeal, the matter may be brought before the supreme court
within a short time by the usual petition for hearing procedure. In such
cases, there is ordinarily no time lag sufficient to frustrate the purposes
of the petition. Indeed, if a district court of appeal denies the petition
without issuing an alternative writ, the petitioner must file his request
for a hearing with the supreme court within 10 days. 7
The problem becomes acute, however, when the application is first
made to a superior court in an attack upon the jurisdiction of an inferior
tribunal. If the petitioner must take an appeal through the usual ap-
pellate processes from an order denying the writ, the inferior tribunal
may continue to act with the result that the prohibition proceeding may
become moot before the appeal is ever heard. Thus one seeking to re-
strain a justice or municipal court from proceeding with a criminal
prosecution may find himself tried, convicted and sentenced while his
appeal is pending from an order of the superior court denying a writ
of prohibition.38
Nevertheless, it has been insisted that the petitioner is required to
appeal the denial and may not file a new petition in a district court of
appeal.39 The problem was reexamined in Caputo v. Municipal Court,4
where it was held that the petitioner was not limited to the appeal pro-
cedure. There the municipal court had granted the people's motion for
continuance of a criminal trial over defendant's objection and without
an adequate showing of cause. The superior court denied defendant's
petition for prohibition to restrain the criminal trial. Instead of ap-
pealing from that order, the defendant presented a new petition to the
district court of appeal. This procedure was upheld on the ground that
the purpose of the prohibition proceeding might otherwise be frustrated.
Use of Prohibition Before Trial
In prohibition proceedings instituted before there has been a trial
in the inferior tribunal there is ordinarily no problem of another ade-
'NMoore v. Mumcipal Court, 170 Cal. App. 2d 548, 339 P.2d 196 (1959); compare
Caputo v. Municipal Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 412, 7 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1960) (permitting
new application in appellate court in lieu of appeal from order of denial).
" CAL. RULES Ox APPEAL 28(b).
N Tins actually occurred in Baker v. Municipal Court, 198 Cal. App. 2d 556, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 642 (1961) whereupon the court affirmed the order on the ground it was moot.
'Lambert v. Municipal Court, 174 Cal. App. 2d 601, 345 P.2d 98 (1959)
' 184 Cal. App. 2d 412, 421, 7 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1960)
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quate remedy or of attempting to review completed action. Such prob-
lems occasionally arise but at this stage the usual issue is that of juris-
diction and it is in these decisions that the prohibition concept of juris-
diction is defined by practical application.
Jurisdiction Over Person - Validity of Service
A question of jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is involved
where a defendant claims that the trial court has acquired no jurisdic-
tion over his person by reason of insufficient or defective service of
process, or an entire lack of service. The jurisdictional nature of the
issue being clear, there remains only to consider the adequacy of other
remedies. Prohibition is the traditional means of testing validity of
service of process, for the defendant has no other reasonable alternative.
If he makes a general appearance, he waives his contest to jurisdiction,
and if he permits a default, he may waive his right to defend on the
merits. Consequently, prohibition has always been held proper to
restrain the trial court from proceeding after denial of a motion to
quash service.41
There is now a statutory remedy by writ of mandate requiring entry
of an order quashing service2 and it may be expected that mandate will
replace prohibition in this field unless unusual circumstances are
present.
Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter
Another traditional use of prohibition, also involving jurisdiction
in the fundamental sense, is to test jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action pending in the inferior court, e.g., whether or not that
court may adjudicate issues arising out of a church controversyo or a
labor dispute."
Concurrent Jurisdiction of Different Courts
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in the fundamental sense is
probably also involved in the following rules:
When two or more tribunals in this State have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the same parties and the same subject matter, the tribunal
first assuming jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all other tribu-
nals in which the matter might have been initiated. Thereafter another
tribunal may be restrained by prohibition if it attempts to proceed,
although it might have taken jurisdiction originally."
4 Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 304, 2 P.2d 756 (1931)
' CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 416.3.
"Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 55, 251 P.2d 10 (1952).
"Calise v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 2d 126, 132, 135, 323 P.2d 859 (1958).
Greene v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 307, 310, 231 P.2d 821 (1951); Loftis v.
Superior Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d 148, 23 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1962)
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Jurisdiction is acquired within this rule when the summons and
complaint are served; that is, priority is determined by the first service
and not by the first filing.46
A basic requirement is that both courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
If one of the courts has exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the nature
of the action, then the priority rule does not apply. 7
Similarly, prohibition cannot be granted where the causes of action
are separate and distinct or the parties are not the same in the two
actions.4"
An essential element of the priority-of-jurisdiction rule is the ex-
istence of two different tribunals in which the two actions are pending.
This element is not present where both actions are filed in the same
superior court, although assigned to different departments. There is
only one superior court in any particular county; all actions brought in
that court are within the same jurisdiction, and there is no problem of
any conflict of jurisdiction.49
Concurrent Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction
The priority problem arises not only where concurrent jurisdiction
would exist to decide the entire subject matter of the two proceedings,
but also where two tribunals have equal jurisdiction at the outset to
determine jurisdiction. Thus, the Industrial Accident Commission has
power to determine its jurisdiction in an industrial accident claim and
the superior court has equal power to decide its jurisdiction in an
action to recover personal injuries. Concurrent jurisdiction to deter-
mine jurisdiction exists in the commission and in the court where
proceedings are brought in both tribunals involving the same parties
and subject matter. However, once determined, jurisdiction is exclusive
and not concurrent, and the decision of one tribunal will be res judicata
in the other. In such a situation it is held that the tribunal whose juris-
diction is first invoked shall determine the question of exclusive juris-
diction and proceedings in the other tribunal (unless voluntarily stayed)
will be halted by the writ of prohibition until final determination of the
jurisdictional question by the first tribunal."0
"'CAt. CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 416; Cade v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 2d 554, 559, 12
Cal. Rptr. 847 (1961), Burch v. Slanun, 137 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3, 289 P.2d 498 (1955)
4Robinson v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 2d 263, 267-68, 21 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962)
(writ denied where respondent court had sole jursdiction in the action filed therein to
enforce a lien on real estate).
"Adolph v. Municipal Court, 181 Cal. 2d 198, 201, 5 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1960).
"Brown v. Campbell, 110 Cal. 644, 648-49, 43 Pac. 12 (1895); Kromm v. Kromm,
84 Cal. App. 2d 523, 528-29, 191 P.2d 115 (1948)
"Scott v. Industrial Ace. Comnn'n. 46 Cal. 2d 76, 81, 83, 89, 293 P.2d 18 (1956);
Taylor v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 148, 149, 301 P.2d 866 (1956).
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Joznder of Partzes
Whether or not the failure of a trial court to compel the joinder of
additional parties results in a jurisdictional defect depends upon
whether the parties are indispensable or merely necessary. If a court
attempts to proceed in an action without the presence of indispensable
parties, it acts beyond its jurisdiction and may be restrained by pro-
hibition.51 On the other hand, while it may be error to fail to join a
necessary party, the error does not go to the jurisdiction of the court
and will not warrant prohibition unless the absent party is also in-
dispensable."2
Dismissals and Defaults
Where the trial court refuses to dismiss an action for failure to
bring it to trial within the statutory period, either a writ of mandate
to compel dismissal or a writ of prohibition to prevent trial of the action
is an appropriate remedy. 3
Similarly, the right to dismissal of a slander action for failure to
post security for costs may be tested by prohibition. 4 It may also be
used to prevent the lower court from acting after dismissal of the action
on any matter unrelated to the dismissal,5 and to restrain the court
from considering a demurrer or motion for change of venue presented
after plaintiff's request for entry of default was properly filed. 6
Security for Costs
A court acts in excess of its jurisdiction in the prohibition sense if
it entertains an action without requiring the posting of security for costs
when security is prescribed by statute 7 or, conversely, if it attempts
to require security in a case to which the statute does not apply."
Appointment of Receiver
As has been noted, jurisdiction in prohibition proceedings includes
situations in which the lower court has no power to act except in a
"Bank of California v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516, 522-23, 106 P.2d 879 (1940).
Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 574, 583, 283 P.2d 704 (1955), Peabody Seating
Co. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 537, 542-43, 20 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1962) ; see CAL.
CODE CIV. PRoc. § 389.
J. C. Penney Co. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 666, 669, 343 P.2d 919 (1959), Tomales
Bay Oyster Corp. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 389, 392, 217 P.2d 968 (1950); Mass. v.
Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 2d 430, 433, 17 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1961)
"Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 2d 348, 352, 37 P.2d 1078 (1934) ; see
Kennaley v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 512, 514-15, 275 P.2d 1 (1954)
5Cf. Lord v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 2d 855, 857, 858, 168 P.2d 14 (1946) (retaining
jurisdiction to deternne disposition of funds held in custody of the court).
" W A. Rose Co. v. Municipal Court, 176 Cal. App. 2d 67, 1 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1959).
"See note 54 supra.
"Hagan v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 498, 502-03, 2 Cal. Rptr. 288, 348 P.2d 896 (1960)
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particular manner or to give certain kinds of relief or to act without
the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites." Thus, an attempt
to appoint a receiver other than in compliance with the statutory re-
quirements is subject to attack by prohibition."
Restraining Preliminary Injunctzons
In cases where the trial court has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action (jurisdiction in the fundamental sense), it is clear
that the writ of prohibition should issue to restrain enforcement of an
order to show cause or a preliminary injunction.61 Enforcement of a
preliminary injunction has also been restrained by prohibition where
injunctive relief is precluded by statute.' However, prohibition is not
available if the injunction suit involves questions of fact or discre-
tionary relief within the general power of the trial court under the
circumstances.63
Correcting Judicial Error
A trial court has no power to correct judicial error in entering an
order or judgment which is directly appealable except on a motion
authorized by statute. Where a correction is attempted otherwise than
as permitted by statute, the court will be restrained by prohibition from
giving effect to the "correcting" order.64 Such decisions again illustrate
the manner in which prohibition is actually used as a corrective writ by
phrasing it in terms of restraint.
Sufficiency of Complaint - Right to Maintain Actzon
Ordinarily the sufficiency of a complaint in a civil action will not
be considered on application for writ of prohibition. If a demurrer is
erroneously overruled, the only remedy is an appeal from the final judg-
ment in the action.65
"Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942 (1941).
' Rondos v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 190, 195, 311 P.2d 113 (1957) There
the writ was granted to restrain the superior court from enforcing its order appointing a
receiver, thus indicating the manner in which prohibition can be as much corrective as
preventive.
Calise v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 2d 126, 135, 323 P.2d 859 (1958) (labor
lispute within exclusive jurisdiction of a federal agency)
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 423, 430, 333 P.2d 745 (1959)
(attempting to enjoin enactment or enforcement of a valid statute or ordinance); Evans
v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 563, 580, 96 P.2d 107 (1939) (rejecting the "completed action"
objection where injunction restrained a public officer from carrying out Ins official powers
and duties).
Brock v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 2d 682, 687, 688, 81 P.2d 931 (1938), Agricultural
Prorate Cmm'n v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 550, 586-87, 55 P.2d 495 (1936)
"Greene v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 403, 405-06, 10 Cal. Rptr. 817, 359 P.2d 249
(1961), City of San Diego v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 483, 486-87, 224 P.2d 685 (1950).
'Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 630, 637, 284 P.2d 9 (1955), Tide Water Asso-
ciated Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 815, 827, 279 P.2d 35 (1955).
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However, certain fundamental objections to a pleading or an action
have been deemed to raise jurisdictional issues such that the action may
be restrained by the writ. In this category are a claim of sovereign
immunity,66 the power of a city to maintain an eminent domain action, 7
the right to maintain a cross-complaint," the sufficiency of a pleading to
warrant appointment of a receiver,69 and the expiration of the period of
limitations in a statutory action in which the cause of action would be
extinguished if the period had expired."
What other objections to a pleading, action or cross-action are suf-
ficient to create a jurisdictional question is not clear. A rule of thumb
may be suggested to the effect that jurisdictional objections are limited
to those matters which are derived from a constitutional provision, an
express statute or a rule of decision, which relates to the functioning of
courts as contrasted with the rights of litigants, when the objections
present purely questions of law in which no factual issue is involved or
at least predominant.
Thus failure to comply with a governmental claim statute has been
held nonjurisdictional on the ground that the statute pertains to the
rights of litigants and not to the functioning of courts.7 A plea of res
judicata usually involves factual and legal issues (such as identity of
parties, validity of the prior judgment, the issues adjudicated, etc.)
which should be determined by the trial court. Hence, the plea itself
does not raise a jurisdictional question and prohibition will not be
granted.72
Prohibiting Discovery
The writ of prohibition has been frequently used to restrain enforce-
ment of an order for inspection of documents which are claimed to be
privileged or otherwise not subject to discovery." The use of the writ
in discovery matters has been justified on the ground that "a failure of
justice will occur in a matter of public importance by a wrongful or
People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 756, 178 P.2d 1 (1947).
" Harden v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 630, 638, 284 P.2d 9 (1955)
Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 815, 827, 279 P.2d 35
(1955), Alexander v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 2d 54, 338 P.2d 502 (1959).
'Rondos v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 190, 194-95, 311 P.2d 113 (1957)
"Gorbacheff v. Justice's Court, 31 Cal. 2d 178, 189, 187 P.2d 407 (1947)
'Redlands-High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 348, 360, 125 P.2d 490
(1942) (denying certiorari).
"Sayegh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 814, 816, 285 P.2d 267 (1955) ; Reidy v. Supe-
rior Court, 220 Cal. 111, 112, 29 P.2d 780 (1934) To be distinguished are cases wherein
the adjudication occurred in the same action pursuant to a judgment or order which has
become final. Burgermeister Brewing Corp. v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 368, 15
Cal. Rptr. 751 (1961).
"Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 368-69, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364
P.2d 266 (1961); Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 505, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954);
Union Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 286, 290, 311 P.2d 640 (1957)
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excessive exercise of jurisdiction," and that the public interest indicates
"the necessity for prompt settlement of the issue."'74
The concept of "jurisdiction" in discovery proceedings is difficult
to justify or explain. In this special field it seems apparent that the
writs have been used as a matter of necessity, irrespective of any actual
jurisdictional objection. The purposes of a statutory privilege will be
wholly or largely frustrated if the petitioner is required to submit to
discovery and thereafter to take an appeal from a subsequent judgment.
The appeal may be fruitless in any event unless the discovery order
had a direct effect on the judgment, so that error was prejudicial in
the traditional sense. On the other hand, if the party stands on his
claim of privilege or other objection to discovery, his action may be
dismissed or a default judgment may be taken against him, with the
result that the party must choose between submitting to discovery or
waiving a trial on the merits."
Nevertheless, in Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superor Court76
the supreme court cautioned that "these discretionary writs" should
not issue as a matter of course in all cases where the discovery order
appears erroneous. It was said that notwithstanding the inadequacy
of remedy by subsequent appeal from the final judgment, "the pre-
rogative writs should only be used in discovery matters to review ques-
tions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial
courts and to the profession, and where general guidelines can be laid
down for future cases.
This concept of judicial "discretion" seems wholly unsound. To
deny relief to one litigent merely because another litigant has re-
ceived the same relief under the same circumstances is not the exercise
of a judicial discretion at all, but is exactly the contrary. That to some
extent the rulings and decisions of the supreme court are advisory in
nature may be conceded,78 but that is no reason why the district courts
of appeal should deny writs in the exercise of the "discretion" suggested.
Indeed, if a trial court orders discovery in the face of appellate decisions
prohibiting it, that would seem to be an additional reason for granting
a writ rather than a ground for denying it.
7" City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 156, 160, 238 P.2d
581 (1951).
" Unger v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 180 Cal. App. 2d 17, 179, 4 Cal. Rptr. 370
(1960), rehearng denied per curam, 180 Cal. App. 2d 186, 5 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1960).
"58 Cal. 2d 180, 23 Cal. Rptr. 375, 373 P.2d 439 (1962)
"Id. at 185-86, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 378, 373 P.2d at 442, footnote 4 of the opinion.
"
3See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364
P.2d 266 (1961) ; CAL. RULES ON APPEAL 29(a).
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Crnmnal Cases - Formation of Grand Jury
Mere irregularities, as distinguished from jurisdictional defects,
occurring in the formation of a grand jury will not nullify the indict-
ment or warrant restraint by prohibition. The distinction made is be-
tween acts of a body having no semblance of authority (jurisdictional)
and acts of a body proceeding under a color of authority, although not
entirely regular in its organization (nonjurisdictional)."
- Constitutional Questions
While earlier decisions indicated that habeas corpus was the proper
remedy, it now appears to be settled that prohibition may be used to
restrain a criminal prosecution under an ordinance or statute which
is claimed to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid or inoperative."
- Sufficiency of Cause to Hold Defendant for Trial
The writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to test the right of the
People to proceed with a prosecution when the validity of an indictment
or information is challenged on the ground that the defendant has been
indicted or committed without reasonable or probable cause. The writ
will issue if no competent evidence was offered at the preliminary ex-
amination to support a reasonable belief that the offense charged was
committed and that the defendant committed it."1 So also, a defendant
held to answer solely on the basis of inadmissible (illegally obtained)
evidence is entitled to prohibition to restrain further prosecution of the
criminal case.'
In these cases it is apparent that jurisdiction in the fundamental
sense is lacking. But the fact that an illegal arrest or search or seizure
occurred does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to try the defendant,"
nor will the prosecution of a criminal case be restrained where it is not
shown that the only evidence against the defendant was illegally ob-
tained."
Use of Prohibition During Trial
In the usual situation there will not be time, opportunity or occasion
to present a petition for a writ of prohibition during the course of a
trial. There are occasional instances where a continuance has been
"Fitts v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 2d 514, 521, 51 P.2d 66 (1935)
w Whitney v. Municipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 911, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 377 P.2d 80
(1962) (ordinance imposed requirements in a field pre-empted by general law), Lambert
v. Municipal Court, 53 Cal. 2d 690, 691, 3 Cal. Rptr. 168, 349 P.2d 984 (1960) (same);
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal. 2d 460, 465-66, 171 P.2d 8 (1946), (ordinance
claimed unconstitutional); Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 41, 324 P.2d
990 (1958) (complaint failed to state a public offense).
'Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 7, 8, 291 P.2d 929 (1955)
" Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 271, 294 P.2d 23 (1956)
"'People v. Valenti, 49 Cal. 2d 199, 203, 316 P.2d 633 (1957).
" Bird v. Justice Court, 182 Cal. App. 2d 674, 678-79, 6 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1960).
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obtained for that purpose.'i A more common use of prohibition is to
restrain a further trial after the case has been partially tried and an
interlocutory judgment entered.86
Use of Prohibition After Trial or Judgment
Preventing Entry of Judgment
Prohibition has been issued to restrain judges from making findings
and entering judgment where their disqualification is discovered after
trial and before judgment.87 It is also a means of restraining a superior
court from issuing, after entry of a minute order, a peremptory writ
of mandate to an administrative board, where the court is seeking by
mandate to control discretion within the area lawfully entrusted to the
board.'
The problem facing the petitioner in such instances is that of pre-
ventive versus corrective action. If the alternative writ is not issued
promptly, there may not be any remaining judicial action to restrain
except, possibly, the enforcement of the judgment or order.
Staying Executzon or Enforcement of Judgment
A trial court is without jurisdiction to order issuance of a writ of
execution in a divorce action in the absence of a judgment requiring
the payment of money, and the writ of prohibition is appropriate to
stay proceedings for issuance of execution. 9
In civil cases the enforcement of a judgment has been restrained for
lack of any valid service of summons." But the courts have generally
refused to stay enforcement of a criminal conviction on the ground that
judicial action has been completed.91
Preserving Rights Pending Appeal
It has been said that where an immediate appeal is available which
would divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed, the remedy of
appeal will accomplish everything which could be done by prohibition
and the writ will be denied." But this statement presupposses that the
'Michaels v. Superior Court, 184, App. 2d 820, 7 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1960) (writ sought
to restrain a contempt proceeding denied)
UProvidence Baptist Church v. Supenro Curt, 40 Cal. 2d 55, 60, 251 P.2d 10 (1952)
(writ denied on merits after considering claim that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a
church dispute was lacking).
'Hall v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. 373, 387, 245 Pac. 814 (1926).
"City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 244, 1 Cal. Rptr.
158, 347 P.2d 294 (1959)
UBerg v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 2d 565,566,568, 5 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1960).
"Bakersfield Hacienda, Inc. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 2d 798, 802, 18 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1962).
'McCornck v. Municipal Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 819, 820-21, 16 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1961) (habeas corpus granted instead), Schoenfeldt v. Municipal Court, 187 Cal. App.
2d 748, 9 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1960).
"People v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 510, 511, 295 P.2d 464 (1956)
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trial court knows that the judgment is stayed pending appeal and is will-
ing to abide by the stay. In fact, trial courts do not always manifest such
knowledge or willingness and the writ of prohibition may be necessary
to enforce the stay effected by the appeal.93
Moreover, in some instances an appeal does not accomplish a stay
unless a bond is posted. If the appellant-petitioner is unable to obtain
a bond, his rights may be lost before his appeal is heard, and, provided
that a jurisdictional question is presented, the judgment or order should
be stayed by prohibition.94
Restraining Appellate Courts
An appellate court may be restrained by prohibition from acting
beyond its jurisdiction in considering an untimely appeal95 or in acting
on a mandate proceeding where the mandate petitioner had failed t9
exhaust his administrative remedies."'
New Trial Proceedings
Prohibition is a proper remedy to prevent a new trial where the
order granting it was not valid as to the petitioner.97 Issues adjudicated
in the same case by a prior judgment cannot be retried where no appeal
was taken from that part of the judgment and it is final. A threatened
retrial of such issues will be restrained by the writ of prohibition."
Prohibition is also appropriate to prevent the retrial of a criminal
case when the defendant has been once in jeopardy.9
Conclusion
The foregoing review is far from exhaustive but it is illustrative.
While one may quibble with the jurisdictional concepts sometimes ap-
plied in prohibition proceedings, there is no doubt that the writ of
prohibition has served as a useful, important and even vital means of
review in instances where a prompt determination of the fundamental
rights of parties is essential to justice.
The extent to which the writ will continue to perform its proper
function will depend upon the manner in which "discretion" is exercised
in granting or denying it. A legal, reasoned discretion will insure its
long life.
" Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 676, 684, 242 P.2d 321 (1952) (attempted change
of custody rights pending appeal).
" Rondos v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 190, 193-94, 311 P.2d 113 (1957) (stay
of order appointing receiver where the nature of the business was such that an appeal might
he useless).
" Reber v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 622, 625, 11 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1961).
9'Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 109 P.2d 942 (1941).
TLee v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 161, 16 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1961) (failure to
serve motion on petitioner, a codefendant in the action)
Burgermeister Brewing Corp. v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d 368, 15 Cal. Rprt.
751 (1961) (distinguishing decisions on res judicata involving two separate actions).
"Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 1, 5, 22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641 (1962).
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